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The objective of this thesis is to discuss whether triangular cases are problematic in Finland and 
how they are or would be handled in Finland when Finland is in one of the three roles of the 
triangular case: the source state, the residence state or the PE state.  A triangular case is a situation 
where a resident of one state has a permanent establishment in another state, which derives income 
in the form of dividends, interest or royalties from a third state. Triangular cases raise two kinds of 
problems: firstly, there is a possibility of unrelieved double taxation, and secondly, the problem of 
treaty abuse and double non-taxation. 
The thesis is done by conducting a literary research. The main topics concerning triangular cases 
are international double taxation and tax treaties. These topics are discussed to the extent that they 
concern triangular cases. Further, EU tax law and directives are looked at, as well as Finnish 
international tax law. As an example case to examine triangular cases in Finland, a Nordic situation 
with Finland, Sweden and Denmark involved is discussed.  
Besides discussing triangular cases in Finland, also BEPS measures concerning triangular cases 
are looked at. The most relevant actions from the BEPS Action Plan are presented, and the overall 
impact of the action plan on triangular cases in Finland and worldwide is assessed.  
It was anticipated in this thesis that it would not be entirely clear how the taxing rights in 
triangular cases are divided. Regarding Finland the example case, however, reveals no problematic 
situations, and based on the example case and other research conducted in the thesis it is concluded 
that triangular cases in Finland are not likely to cause a lot of problems. The research further reveals 
that BEPS Action Plan will most likely not change the way triangular cases are handled in Finland. 
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Tutkielman tarkoituksena on tarkastella sekä sitä, ovatko verotuksen kolmikantatilanteet 
ongelmallisia Suomessa, että sitä, minkälainen tulon verokohtelu on kun Suomi on eri rooleissa 
kolmikantatilanteessa: tulon lähdevaltio, asuinvaltio tai kiinteän toimipaikan valtio. 
Kolmikantatilanteella tarkoitetaan tilannetta, jossa  yhdessä valtiossa asuvalla yrityksellä on kiinteä 
toimipaikka toisessa valtiossa, ja tämä kiinteä toimipaikka saa osinkoja, korkotuloa tai rojalteja 
kolmannesta valtiosta. Kolmikantatilanteet aiheuttavat kahdenlaisia ongelmia: niissä voi syntyä 
kansainvälistä kaksinkertaista verotusta, tai veronkiertotarkoituksessa voidaan pyrkiä jopa 
kaksinkertaiseen verottomuuteen.  
Tutkielmassa tehdään kirjallisuuskatsaus, jonka pääaiheina ovat kolmikantatilanteisiin liittyvät 
kansainvälinen kaksinkertainen verotus sekä verosopimukset. Näitä aiheita käsitellään erityisesti 
kolmikantatilanteiden valossa. Lisäksi tarkastellaan EU-vero-oikeutta ja EU-direktiivejä sekä 
Suomen kansainvälistä vero-oikeutta, jotka kukin asettavat omat rajansa kolmikantatilanteiden 
käsittelylle. Kolmikantatilanteita Suomessa tutkitaan esimerkkitapauksen kautta. Esimerkissä 
käydään läpi Suomea eri rooleissa, kun muut osallisina olevat maat ovat Ruotsi ja Tanska. 
Tutkielmassa keskitytään ensisijaisesti kolmikantatilanteisiin Suomen näkökulmasta, mutta 
lisäksi tarkastellaan OECD-maiden BEPS-ohjelman vaikutuksia kolmikantatilanteisiin niin 
kansainvälisesti kuin Suomessa.  
Tutkielman hypoteesina on, että verotusoikeuksien jakautuminen kolmikantatilanteissa 
Suomessa on monimutkaista ja jopa epäselvää. Esimerkkitilanteen valossa tutkielmassa kuitenkin 
todetaan, että ongelmallisia tilanteita ei ilmene, ja sekä esimerkkitilanteen että muun tutkielmassa 
esitetyn materiaalin perusteella tullaan siihen johtopäätökseen, että kolmikantatilanteet eivät 
aiheuta ongelmia Suomessa. Tutkielmassa todetaan myös, että BEPS-ohjelman seurauksena ei 
todennäköisesti tule minkäänlaisia muutoksia kolmikantatilanteiden käsittelyyn Suomessa.  
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1 Introduction 
A triangular case occurs in a cross-border situation where bilateral tax treaties don’t resolve 
problems that occur when three or more states are involved. The IBFD International Tax 
Glossary defines triangular cases as follows: 
Term used most commonly in the context of relieving double taxation where more 
than two (typically three) states are involved. For example, a resident of one state 
(State R) has a permanent establishment in another state (State P), which in turn 
derives income in the form of dividends, interest or royalties from a third state (State 
S), thus raising the issue (if double taxation treaties have been concluded between 
the states) which tax treaty should be applied to relieve double taxation in State S, 
i.e. should the R-P or the R-S treaty be applied?1  
In this thesis, the terms used to describe the roles of the states are source state, residence state 
and PE state. The basic triangular case, which is also the one discussed in this thesis, is 
described in picture 1. 
 
 
Triangular cases have been recognized as problematic situations by the OECD already in 1992, 
yet they are still a topical issue – possibly even more topical than in the 1990s. In their report 
in 1992, OECD outlined that as international economic co-operation as well as integration 
within the European Communities grow, triangular cases are expected to occur more 
frequently. OECD already recognized both problems occurring due to triangular cases: double 
                                                
1 Rogers-Glabush 2009: 453 
PE	State
Residence	
StateSource	State
Dividend,	
interest	or	
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Picture 1. Basic triangular case 
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taxation and tax avoidance.2 The problems are evidently not easy to resolve as they still exist 
despite the recognition more than 20 years ago. OECD is, however, currently aiming at tackling 
the tax avoidance issue in the framework of its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
program, which is one reason for the topic being timely at the moment.  
1.1 Research Questions, Objectives and Hypothesis 
The primary objective of this thesis is to discuss whether triangular cases are problematic in 
Finland and how they are or would be handled in Finland when Finland is in one of the three 
roles of the triangular case: the source state, the residence state or the PE state. For the source 
state, the focus is on the application of the correct taxation at source. For the residence state 
and the PE state, the attention should be more on the elimination of double taxation. It is 
recognized in this thesis that an exhaustive answer to the question might not be reached since 
the end result is always dependent on the states and tax treaties involved. There is, however, 
an objective to describe the possible outcomes with the help of an example case. 
The secondary objective is to inspect triangular cases in the light of changes that are likely to 
occur as a consequence of the BEPS Action Plan. The Actions that are most likely to affect 
triangular cases and their possible effects will be will be discussed to the extent that is possible 
with the BEPS Action Plan still being developed. 
Based on the material and the information about triangular cases that have been explored before 
writing this thesis, a conclusion has been made that triangular cases seem problematic and no                                
reason has come out to expect that Finland is an exception in this matter. Therefore, the research 
hypothesis is that triangular cases are problematic in Finland, too. Also, it is expected that there 
is no unambiguous explanation as to how triangular cases are handled in Finland. Further, 
concerning BEPS, it is assumed that it is difficult to say exactly how things will change after 
BEPS but it seems clear that thing will change. 
The research concentrates on the most common triangular cases, that is, the PE triangular cases 
of enterprises where no more or less than three states are involved. Cases with more states 
                                                
2 OECD 1992: 4 
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involved are not looked at. Dual resident triangular cases3 are also outside the scope of this 
thesis and they are only looked at on a brief, summarizing manner. Further, the income 
considered is passive income: dividends4, interest and royalties. Other types of income are not 
discussed. For the purposes of this thesis, only tax treaties based on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention are studied as they are most relevant from the point of view of a Finnish resident. 
For the same reason, the main emphasis is in cases that revolve around the European Union. 
1.2 Sources and Previous Research 
This study is done by conducting a literary research. There has been research concerning 
triangular cases for at least some three decades, so the first publications concerning the matter 
can be found from the early 1990s: OECD published their report about triangular cases in their 
series Issues in International Taxation in 1992. Ever since the problem has been recognised, 
there have been ways to try and resolve it, too: for example, in 1993 Philip P. Spector had an 
article published in the Bulletin for international fiscal documentation with the title 
“Triangular Problem” Settled in US-Netherlands Treaty Protocol. This refers to the first anti-
abuse provision that was implemented in the interest and royalties articles of the US-Netherland 
treaty.5 One of the more comprehensive publications since the recognition of the issue has been 
Franz Sutter & Ulf Zehetner’s Triangular Tax Cases in 2004.   
A lot of the information concerning triangular cases is scattered in different articles. This is 
why there are several articles from tax journals that are referred to in this thesis. Triangular 
cases are often discussed as a curiosity when discussing different topics, and when put together, 
there is a fair amount of information – it just need to be found in different places.  
One of the most recent broad – possibly the broadest up to date – research publication 
concerning triangular cases is Emily Fett’s Doctoral Thesis Triangular Cases: The Application 
                                                
3 A dual resident triangular case is one where a person is resident in two states for tax purposes and receives 
income from sources in a third state, cf. Fett 2014:11 
4 Both direct investment dividends, i.e. inter-company dividends, and portfolio dividends are looked at. Distinction 
between these two is, however, not made unless their tax treatment differs. 
5 Rust & Wöhrer in Lang et al (Eds) 2016: 112 
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of Bilateral Income Tax Treaties in Multilateral Situations from 2014. As Fett herself describes 
the situation: 
[…] there has been no comprehensive and detailed analysis of all the issues that can 
arise in triangular cases or of the range of potential solutions. […] The intention of 
this thesis is therefore to present a comprehensive analysis of the issues arising in 
PE triangular cases [...]. 6 
Since Fett’s thesis can be considered if not the most, then at least one of the most 
comprehensive single publication concerning the subject, it will also be cited in several parts 
of this thesis. 
Even though Fett’s thesis was published only two years ago, it has to be taken into account that 
at present there are significant developments under way, particularly in the form of BEPS 
Action Plan. BEPS Actions might affect triangular cases drastically, which is why it is 
important to review an even more recent publication that reflects the post-BEPS world. The 
part of this thesis that looks at post-BEPS world will refer to several publications concerning 
BEPS, but one of the publications that fits the topic of this thesis especially well is Alexander 
Rust and Viktoria Wöhrer’s Anti-Abuse Clauses for Permanent Establishments Situated in 
Third Countries, which was published in 2016 in Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): 
The Proposals to Revise the OECD Model Convention. 
It is clear that the subject has not remained unnoticed internationally. As for triangular cases in 
Finland or in Finnish, there isn’t much previous research available. There is, however, a good 
amount of research done about Finnish international taxation in general. For the purposes of 
this thesis, mostly the continuously updated e-book Finnish International Taxation by 
Marjaana Helminen is cited. Several other publications by Helminen have been useful sources 
in this thesis, too. 
1.3 Structure  
This thesis begins with the discussion of what international double taxation actually is, since 
double taxation and the elimination of it is, as a matter of fact, an essential reason for the 
                                                
6 Fett 2014: 18 
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existence of the problem of triangular cases. Further, the thesis looks at the effects that EU tax 
law and EU directives have on triangular cases.  
Chapter 5 first looks at tax treaties in general and the goes deeper into discussing relevant treaty 
provisions concerning triangular cases. Chapter 6 deals with triangular cases in general: what 
they actually are, how taxing rights are split in triangular cases and what kind of problems the 
cases cause.  
In chapter 7, Finnish tax law is discussed with relation to triangular cases: what kind of 
provisions Finnish international tax law and tax treaties concluded by Finland include. These 
are looked at in practice in chapter 8 where a Nordic example case is presented.  
Finally, chapter 9 takes a look at ongoing and future changes that might affect triangular cases 
in Finland and worldwide. Conclusions are made in chapter 10. 
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2 International Double Taxation 
The OECD defines international double taxation as follows: 
International double taxation arises when comparable taxes are imposed in two or 
more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same taxable income or capital, 
e.g. where income is taxable in the source country and in the country of residence 
of the recipient of such income.7 
International double taxation is an essential subject when discussing triangular cases, because 
trying to avoid double taxation actually gives rise to the setting. Without relief methods, 
triangular cases could even end up in triple taxation. Due to the relief methods, it is, however, 
possible to have the income taxed in one state only. It is also possible to utilise triangular 
situations for tax planning purposes, in which case the tax payer might end up paying little or 
no tax on the income. 
There are two forms of international double taxation: juridical and economic. International 
juridical double taxation occurs when a person is taxed in two or more states for the same 
income, while economic double taxation is a consequence of taxation of the same income in 
the hands of more than one person.8 The form of double taxation that is present in this thesis is 
international juridical double taxation. 
As international juridical double taxation has harmful effects on the exchange of goods and 
services as well as on movements of capital, technology and persons9, it is in the interest of 
many to effectively eliminate double taxation. Eliminating international double taxation is also 
one of the EU’s central objectives.10 As regards the solutions to eliminating problems caused 
by uncoordinated tax systems within the EU, there are several that have been proposed. The 
proposals include solutions such as the most favoured nation principle, an EU directive, the 
strengthening of source state taxation, an EU model tax convention and a multilateral tax 
treaty.11 
                                                
7 OECD 2016b 
8 Helminen 2013: 28 
9 OECD 2014: 7 
10 Helminen 2014: 2 
11 Ibid.: 3–4 
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Currently a lot of attention in the elimination of double taxation is focused on tax treaties. 
According to the OECD Model Tax Convention, the elimination of international double 
taxation may be done by an exemption method or a credit method. EU Member States, for 
instance, are free to choose the method that they apply in eliminating double taxation. 
Nonetheless, they have to follow the provisions of directives and respect the non-discrimination 
provision and the basic freedoms of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).12 The fundamental difference between the two methods is that the exemption methods 
focus on income, whereas the credit methods look at tax.13  
The exemption method is described in the OECD Model Tax Convention Article 23 A. It 
states that when a resident of a contracting states receives income that may be taxed in the other 
contracting state, the residence state shall, subject to certain provisions, exempt the income 
from tax.14 In practice, this would either mean that the income taxed in the source state is not 
taken into account at all in the residence state, not even when determining the tax to be imposed 
on the rest of the resident’s income, or, alternatively, that the income is not taxed by the 
residence state but it is, nevertheless, taken into account when considering the tax to be imposed 
on the rest of the income. The latter method is also known as exemption with progression.15  
In the credit method the residence state should, according to OECD MTC Article 23 B, credit 
income tax by deducting the resident’s tax by an amount equal to the income paid in the source 
state16. This method may also be applied in two ways: full credit method allows deduction in 
the residence state of the total amount of tax paid in the source state, whereas ordinary credit 
restricts the deduction given by the residence state to the maximum amount of tax that would 
be imposed on the income were it taxed in the residence state17. 
 
                                                
12 Helminen 2015: 50 
13 OECD 2014: 326 
14 Ibid.: 36 
15 Ibid.: 326 
16 Ibid.: 37 
17Ibid.: 326 
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3 EU Tax Law 
There are many sources of law that are applied within the scope on international taxation. There 
are tax treaties that are most often bilateral treaties, i.e. they are concluded between two states. 
There are national laws that apply to cross-border situations, but there are also international tax 
laws such as the EU tax law in the European Union. The three legal systems include their own 
rules and concepts, which may cause discrepancies in the application of tax law in cross-border 
situations. In case of conflict, EU tax law generally takes precedence over tax treaties. Even 
though there are no explicit provisions that give EU tax law the precedence, the status can be 
concluded from the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Further, tax treaties 
may only limit or modify the application of a national tax law, which is why tax treaties take 
precedence over national tax laws.18  
As stated, the European Union law has supremacy over national laws – even national 
constitutional laws. Directly effective provisions of EU law constitute parts of national law, 
and an EU citizen may rely on these provisions before a national court. Provisions of the TFEU 
are directly applicable and need no implementation into domestic law, whereas the provisions 
of EU Directives require implementation to domestic laws.19  
Direct taxes are not expressly dealt with in the TFEU20, and the most relevant primary law 
provisions regarding direct taxes are four out of the five fundamental freedoms of the EU: free 
movement of workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services and free 
movement of capital.21 The fundamental freedoms set certain limits to the national legislations 
of the EU Member States. This is also known as negative integration.  Positive integration – 
common rules for all EU Member States – includes harmonization and coordination of the 
Member States’ tax legislation. This is namely directives that either remove obstacles within 
the internal market, such as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty 
                                                
18 Helminen 2013: 10–11 
19 Adamczyk in Lang et al 2013: 15 
20 Ibid.: 25 
21 Englmair in Lang et al 2013: 46 
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Directive, or enhance cooperation between tax authorities, like the Mutual Assistance 
Directive.22  
The Non-Discrimination Principle  
The EU founding treaties contain the idea of EU nationals being equal when in comparable 
situations: they should receive the same treatment in law regardless of their nationality unless 
an exception is explicitly included in the founding treaties. This applies to taxation, too. For 
example, tax treaties shall not include provisions that make treaty benefits available only to the 
contracting EU Member States’ nationals and not to other Member State nationals.23 
A key issue in determining whether or not discrimination is present is determining whether or 
not the situation is in fact a comparable situation or a different situation. Different tax treatment 
of companies that are in comparable situations is prohibited, and as a rule even permanent 
establishments of EU resident companies should be subject to same tax treatment as the 
resident companies.24 This is a relevant issue when discussing triangular cases. 
The treatment of PEs compared to resident companies was looked at by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the Saint-Gobain case25 where the ECJ ruled that in EU Member States the PE 
state shall provide relief for source state taxation to the extent that it would be provided to a 
resident of that state.26 The fundamental freedom that was allegedly violated was freedom of 
establishment. In the case, Saint-Gobain SA was a French company that had a PE in Germany. 
The company was subject to limited tax liability in Germany as neither its residence nor 
management were present in Germany. Saint-Gobain was not granted dividend tax benefits as 
in bilateral tax treaties concluded by Germany these benefits were restricted to German resident 
companies. Saint-Gobain argued that this was violation of the non-discrimination principle. 
The CJEU held that even though Member States have the right to determine the means of 
eliminating double taxation themselves, they shall not disregard European law. In this case the 
Court held that the PE was in a comparable situation with a resident company. As Germany 
                                                
22 Adamczyk in Lang et al 2013: 26–27 
23 Helminen 2014: 16–17 
24 Ibid.: 23 
25 C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt 
26 Fett 2014: 111 
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shall not violate the non-discrimination principle, it must grant the treaty benefits that it had 
restricted to residents only.27  
Besides it being a part of the EU founding treaties as well as the EU case law, the non-
discrimination principle is also present in the special provisions of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. Regarding triangular cases, attention should be paid to Article 24(3), which states 
that the taxation of permanent establishments shall not be any less favourable than that of 
enterprises that carry on the same activities in the same state.28 This does not mean that the 
treatment of residents and permanent establishments has to be exactly equal, but only that the 
end result as regards the PE shall not be less favourable.29  
In practice, Article 24(3) means that when credit relief is provided by the PE State under its 
domestic law, the PE State shall grant the relief by virtue of the same principle when such credit 
is granted to resident enterprises. When tax treaty relief is considered, the OECD Commentary 
provides for a “minimum common denominator” solution. This means that if a Member 
country is not able to grant credit based on its domestic law or based on Art. 24(3) of the treaty, 
it is still encouraged to provide credit relief for at least the lesser of the tax levied in the source 
state under the treaty between the source state and the residence state and the tax that would 
have been levied in the PE state were the applicable treaty the one between the PE state and 
the source state.30 
It should, however, be noted that the PE of a company of another Member State must be granted 
“national treatment”, and the protection is thus stronger within the EU than it is when it is 
solely based on Art. 24(3). Therefore, the “minimum common denominator” solution doesn’t 
apply in an intra-EU situation.31 The ECJ already held in the Avoir Fiscal case32 and also kept 
in the Saint-Gobain case that the different tax treatment of residents and non-residents with a 
PE is not justified if they are in a comparable situation. The freedom of establishment shall 
guarantee the right to choose the appropriate legal form for secondary establishments, so the 
                                                
27 Bammens 2012: 585; Schütze 2014: 156 
28 OECD 2014: 38 
29 Fett 2014: 113 
30 Gusmeroli 2005a: 3–4 
31 Gusmeroli 2005b: 48 
32 Case 270/83 Commission v. France 
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national tax treatment of residents is in fact extended to Member State residents’ PEs in that 
state. This is why the principle of inequality of residents and non-residents that prevails in 
international tax law is, in fact, irrelevant in the EU.33 
                                                
33 Martín Jiménez et al. 2001: 243 
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4 Directives 
Directives concerning EU tax law can be grouped according to whether they remove tax 
obstacles or mainly enhance cooperation among tax authorities. 34 The directives that are 
relevant concerning triangular situations are the Directive 2011/95/EU on the common system 
of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States (“Parent-Subsidiary Directive”) and the Directive 2003/49/EC on a common system of 
taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of 
different Member States (“the Interest and Royalty Directive” or “the I+R Directive”), which 
both remove tax obstacles within the internal market.  
4.1 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive concerns the tax treatment of profit distributions between 
parent and subsidiary companies of different Member States. Its objective is to abolish tax 
obstacles on profit distributions between companies in different Member States and thus 
remove the disadvantages of operating internationally within the EU as opposed to operating 
in one Member State only. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive enables tax exempt profit 
distributions between subsidiaries and parent companies located in two different Member 
States. According to the Directive, profit distributions shall be exempted from withholding tax 
in the residence state of the subsidiary and double taxation shall be eliminated in the residence 
state of the parent company.35 A qualifying company according to the Art. 2 of the Directive 
is one that, firstly, is of one of the forms listed in the Directive; secondly, is resident in the state 
for tax purposes and thirdly, is liable to corporate tax in that state. According to Art. 3(a), the 
minimum holding percentage for the status of a parent company is 10 per cent. 
The provisions of the Directive must also be applied where profit distributions are made from 
the subsidiary state and received by permanent establishments of companies of a Member State 
as the freedom of establishment provides that such PEs shall not be subject to less favourable 
tax treatment than resident companies. Where three states are involved with the parent in one, 
                                                
34 Adamczyk in Lang et al. 2013: 26. 
35 Helminen 2015: 155–156 
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subsidiary in the other and a PE in the third Member State, the residence state of the subsidiary 
must not withhold tax on the profit distribution and the PE state must relief it from tax by means 
of exemption or credit.36 The provisions of the Directive are thus applicable to triangular 
situations. Art. 1(2) of the Directive, however, provides that the benefits shall not be granted if 
the arrangement or series of arrangements are not genuine and have only been put into place 
for the main purpose of obtaining tax advantage. 
It should be noted that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive also applies, even though only partially, 
in a situation where the Parent and the Subsidiary are located in Member States and the PE is 
outside the EU. Here the states where the Parent and the Subsidiary reside must comply with 
the provisions of the Directive. The PE State is, however, not obliged to follow the Directive.37  
4.2 The Interest and Royalty Directive 
The Interest and Royalty Directive, as its name indicates, only concerns the interest and royalty 
distributions in triangular cases – dividends are not present in this Directive. The purpose of 
the Interest and Royalty Directive is to eliminate tax obstacles concerning interest and royalty 
payments within a group of companies in cross-border activities. Interest and royalty payments 
arising in a Member State shall be exempted from any taxes in that state as long as the beneficial 
owner of the payment is a company or a PE in another Member State. Similarly to the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, the I+R Directive also presumes that the companies entitled to the 
benefits of the Directive are of a certain type as provided in the annex to the Directive; are tax 
residents in a Member State and are subject to corporate tax in the EU. The minimum direct or 
indirect holding is 10 per cent.38 
When the I+R Directive applies in a triangular case, there must be a payment arising in the 
source state that is beneficially owned in the PE state by a PE of a company of a Member State. 
To be precise, this setting presumes that at least two states are involved, i.e. the source state 
and the PE state are different whereas the residence state may be the same as the source state, 
but in this thesis all states are assumed to be different. When the I+R Directive applies, the 
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37 Ibid.: 161 
38 European Commission 2016 
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source state may not levy withholding tax, which is why there is no issue with relief as regards 
the interaction between the source state and the PE state. The PE state taxes the PE and the 
residence state grants relief for PE income.39 
Unlike the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the I+R Directive doesn’t apply in cases where the 
Parent and Subsidiary are residents of EU Member States whilst the PE isn’t. Article 1(8) of 
the I+R Directive explicitly states that the provisions don’t apply when “interest or royalties 
are paid by or to a permanent establishment situated in a third State”.40 
There are certain definitions in the Directive that would possibly require special attention. For 
example, a Permanent Establishment according to Article 3(c) is “a fixed place of business 
situated in a Member State through which the business of a company of another Member State 
is wholly or partly carried on”.  This is a rather short definition of a PE compared to the lengthy 
definitions that arise elsewhere, such as in the OECD MTC Commentaries, and it raises the 
question of whether or not all PEs according to the OECD MTC are actually regarded PEs in 
the I+R Directive.41 These kinds of questions, as important as they are, fall outside the scope 
of this thesis and will not be looked at any further. 
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5 Tax Treaties 
Tax treaties are agreements that are made between two or more states in order to allocate taxing 
rights between the states. One of the main objectives of tax treaties is to avoid double taxation 
of taxpayers. When tax treaties allocate taxing rights effectively and the treaties are reciprocal, 
one of the contracting states generally gives up some of their taxing rights in order not to have 
the taxpayer taxed at source and at the recipient state level. Besides resolving issues concerning 
double taxation, tax treaties may also include provisions that prohibit discrimination in certain 
cross-border situations where the taxpayer can be considered to be in a situation that is 
comparable to a domestic situation. Furthermore, tax treaties may include provisions 
concerning the exchange of information between contracting states’ authorities.42  
There is a golden rule in tax treaty law, which means that tax treaties may only limit or modify 
the application of domestic tax law. This means that tax treaties may not create new taxing 
rights. If there is a conflict between the tax treaty and domestic laws, the tax treaty provision 
taxes precedence over the domestic law if the tax treaty provisions are more beneficial to the 
tax payer.43 
5.1 Forms of Tax Treaties 
Income tax treaties are often based on a model tax convention. Most countries use one of the 
two major models as a starting point for treaty negotiations: either the OECD Model 
Convention on Income and on Capital (‘the OECD Model Convention’), or the United Nations 
Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. The 
United States also employs its own U.S. Treasury Model.44 In this thesis only the OECD Model 
Convention is presented as it is the model that the income tax treaties in Finland are based on.45 
The thesis is also based on the assumption that the states covered in this thesis use the OECD 
Model Convention as a basis for their treaties.  
                                                
42 Helminen 2013: 3 
43 Helminen 2016: Fundamentals of international tax law > Concept of International Tax Law > Relationship 
among the Legal Systems of International Tax Law > Tax Treaties and Domestic Tax Law 
44 Bischel 2010: 1 
45 Helminen 2013: 5 
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The basic idea behind the OECD Model Convention is clarifying, standardising and confirming 
the taxpayers’ situations in the countries using the OECD Model Convention as basis for their 
tax treaties. Having a uniform basis for tax treaties helps avoid conflicts between tax systems 
and thus resolves the most common problems within international taxation.46 The first OECD 
Draft Convention was published in 1963 and it has been updated constantly, and, for example 
in the 21st century, there have been six updates. The next update is tentatively scheduled for 
2017.47  
The OECD Model Convention is divided into seven chapters. Chapters I and II define the 
persons and taxes covered and provide general definitions as well as the definitions of a 
resident and a permanent establishment. Chapters III and IV describe the taxation on income 
and capital. Chapter V contains the methods for elimination of double taxation; chapter VI 
describes special provisions such as the non-discrimination principle and the mutual agreement 
procedure. Chapter VII is about final provisions: entry into force and termination.48  
5.2 Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties 
Due to the fact that most tax treaties are bilateral, the number of all tax treaties that have been 
concluded worldwide is enormous. According to the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation Tax Treaties Database, there were almost 3000 tax treaties altogether by the 
end of 2013.49 Finland has concluded over sixty tax treaties, the majority of which are bilateral. 
The only multilateral treaty is the one with the Nordic countries50: Denmark, the Faroe Islands, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden.51  
Most treaties are, indeed, bilateral. In the European Union, for example, the Member States 
have broad sovereignty when it comes to taxation. Despite most states using the OECD MTC 
as a starting point for their tax treaties, the details of the treaties in each Member State vary. 
                                                
46 OECD 2014: 7 
47 OECD 2016 
48 OECD 2014: 22 
49 Finnwatch 2014: 11 
50 Convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
with respect to Taxes on Inheritances and Gifts. Convention 19 August 1992 
51 Helminen 2013: 3 
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This leads to unintegrated tax systems, which then leads to conflicts especially in cross-border 
situations.52 One of the suggested solutions to this is a multilateral tax treaty within the EU, but 
thus far the only multilateral income tax convention concluded by the EU Member States is the 
Arbitration Convention that aims at resolving disputes in transfer pricing.53   
The treaty that Finland has concluded with the Nordic countries is actually a rarity: it is one of 
the few multilateral income tax treaties worldwide. It is also based on the OECD MTC, but it 
is modified to fit the needs of more than two parties. What has made the fair functioning of the 
treaty possible has probably been the homogenous nature of all the countries involved: all of 
the five countries have fairly similar tax systems and political interests.54 It is clear that if the 
countries were five randomly picked countries from all over the world, the interests would 
already be different in such ways that a multilateral treaty could most likely not be implemented 
as such.  
According to Marjaana Helminen55, a multilateral tax treaty among the EU states should be 
“the ultimate goal” in the European Union. It could resolve many of the problems that bilateral 
treaties can’t. Multilateralism has already been discussed when the Draft Model Tax 
Convention was released in the 1960s, but when the final OECD MTC was published in 1977, 
a large network of bilateral tax treaties already existed, which made it difficult to go back to 
the idea of multilateralism.56 The idea has, however, lately been discussed more, and were a 
multilateral treaty introduced, bilateral tax treaties within the EU would no longer be needed 
and treaty shopping in the EU could be eliminated.57 The multilateral instrument that is being 
developed within the BEPS framework at the moment58 is leading towards multilateralism, 
even though it is not quite the ultimate goal that Helminen highlights. 
                                                
52 Helminen 2014: 1–2 
53 Ibid.: 5 
54 Ibid.: 7 
55 Ibid.: 5 
56 Silberztein & Tristram 2016: 347 
57 Helminen 2014: 5–6 
58 cf. chapter 9.2 
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5.3 Relevant Treaty Provisions in Tax Treaties 
There are certain provisions in the OECD Model that resolve certain questions concerning 
triangular cases. These provisions are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Persons Covered 
Article 1 defines the persons covered by the treaty. It states that the coverage is “persons who 
are residents of one or both of the Contracting States”. There are thus two requirements for 
treaty entitlement: firstly, being a person fulfilling the definition from Art.3(1)(a), and 
secondly, being a resident as per Article 4.59 
General Definitions 
Article 3 gives the general definitions, and one of the most significant definitions would be the 
person mentioned in the previous paragraph. According to Art. 3(1)(a), a person is either an 
individual, a company or any other body of persons. The Commentaries add to this that the 
term is used in a wide sense and it includes any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax 
purposes. It is debatable whether a PE actually falls within the definition of a person and a clear 
conclusion can’t be made, so this, according to some scholars, does not rule out the PE treaty 
entitlement.60 It can, however, be stated that a PE is clearly not and individual or a company, 
nor is it a body of persons such as a partnership or other unincorporated association would be.61 
Residency 
Article 4 defines the term resident, which is a status necessary for treaty entitlement. Article 
4(1) reads as follows:  
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “resident of a Contracting State” 
means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason 
of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar 
nature, and also includes that State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof. This term, however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that 
State in respect only of income from sources in that State or capital situated therein.  
                                                
59 Yong 2010: 158 
60 Ibid.: 158 
61 Fett 2014: 24 
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Generally it is not the PE that is liable to tax, but the person owning the PE. As PEs are not 
recognized as entities per se, PEs are often not regarded as residents. Other interpretations have, 
however, been made, too.62   
It should, again, be noted that in the European Union the resident status is, in fact, irrelevant in 
triangular cases as PEs of EU companies shall, according to EU case law, receive “national 
treatment”.63  
Other Relevant Provisions 
Articles 10 to 12 define dividends, interest and royalties. For example, for dividends, Article 
10(1) states that dividends that are paid by a company “which is a resident of a Contracting 
State” to a resident of the other state may be taxed in the latter state. Similar provisions 
requiring residency apply to interest and royalties, too. Here, the question of whether or not a 
PE is a resident is crucial, because it is the key question regarding the application of the treaty 
between the source state and the PE state. When it is assumed that a PE is not a person resident 
in one or both of the treaty states, Article 7 concerning business profits is important64.  
Articles 23A and 23B describe the methods for elimination of double taxation: exemption and 
credit methods. Regarding triangular cases, problems can occur when, for example, the 
residence state provides relief for the PE with the exemption method whilst it should apply the 
credit method with regard to the source state.65  
 
                                                
62 Cf. Yong 2010: 158–159 
63 Martín Jiménez 2001: 243 
64  cf. chapter 6.2 for Taxing Rights in PE Triangular Cases 
65 Yong 2010: 160 
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6 Triangular Cases 
A triangular case can arise when a person who is resident in one state and has a permanent 
establishment in another has dealings with a third state. As the word triangular implies, there 
are three parties in the case. What makes the case problematic is the fact that, as stated earlier, 
the vast majority of tax treaties are bilateral. They are therefore designed to resolve bilateral, 
not trilateral situations. A triangular case arises when bilateral income tax treaties don’t operate 
effectively in these situations.66  
There are four different types of triangular cases. The categories concerning permanent 
establishments are PE triangular cases and reverse PE triangular cases. Dual resident categories 
are, respectively, dual resident cases and reverse dual resident cases. This thesis focuses on the 
most typical triangular case, the PE triangular case, which will be discussed in more detail in 
the following paragraphs. The other three categories are not as common as PE triangular cases, 
but they are conceivable. Reverse PE triangular cases occur when a person is resident in the 
residence state and receives income from a head office state, but the income originates in the 
PE state. Dual resident triangular cases occur when a person is resident in two states for tax 
purposes and receives income from a source state. Here there is no PE state involved but two 
residence states instead. In reverse dual resident triangular cases the income flow is the 
opposite: income is generated from the two residence states of the dual resident to a resident of 
a third state.67  
6.1 PE Triangular Cases 
A PE triangular case arises when a person who is resident in one state earns income from 
sources in another state and the income is attributable to a PE in a third state. In the most typical 
cases the income is in the form of dividends or interest. Tax could be imposed under domestic 
laws of all these three states: the source state could impose tax based on the source of income; 
the PE state based on the business activities carried on in that state that derive the income; and 
the residence state based on the residence of the person deriving the income. Even though 
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generally the residence state might provide double taxation relief, it might not be sufficient and 
double taxation may arise.68 Double taxation is avoided in different ways depending on the 
situation. The question is whether tax treaties fully or partly cover the transactions at issue and 
whether domestic tax law applies to PEs similarly as it does in the case of a resident.69 
The tax treaties that are applied in PE triangular cases are the tax treaty between the residence 
state and the source state as well as the treaty between the residence state and the PE state. The 
treaty between the source state and the PE state – where the actual income flow is – is not 
applicable. This is because, as stated earlier, according to the OECD Model Convention, the 
tax treaties apply to persons who are residents in one or both contracting states. A person is, as 
put in the OECD Model Convention Article 3(1), “an individual, a company and any other 
body of persons”.70 As a PE cannot generally be considered to be any of the above, the treaty 
between the source state and the PE state doesn’t apply.71  
In a PE triangular case the situation is thus such that there are three states involved, each of 
which has relations to the others. Income is transferred between two states, and a tax treaty 
applies between the other states. The core issues in a PE triangular case are the following:  
1. For the source state the issue is that only the treaty between the source state and the 
residence state applies since the PE lacks tax treaty entitlement 
2. For the PE state there is an issue of whether or not and to what extent relief for tax 
levied in the source state must be granted under Art. 24(3) of the treaty that it has with 
the residence state 
3. For the residence state there is an obligation to provide relief for income sourced in the 
source state according to the treaty that it has with that state, and, for PE income under 
the provisions of the treaty that it has with the PE state. It is the question of the 
interaction of these two that arises.72  
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6.2 Taxing Rights in PE Triangular Cases 
When passive income, i.e. dividends, interest or royalties, is involved, the issues concerning 
triangular cases are most clearly evident. These situations are the ones that are most commonly 
discussed, which might be due to the fact that in these cases, all three states involved potentially 
have a right to impose tax on the income.73 The typical case in passive income triangular cases 
is such that a resident of the source state pays income to a resident of the residence state and 
that income is attributable to the PE in the PE state.  
In the following paragraphs, each of these income types and their treatment in the three states 
are discussed. It is assumed that the tax treaties are based on the OECD Model. First, the basic 
case is looked at. Then the case is looked at from the point of view of the source state, the PE 
state and the residence state. Finally, a conclusion of the above is made. 
6.2.1 Dividends 
According to OECD Model Convention Art. 10(1), dividends paid by a company resident in 
the source state to a resident of the residence state may be taxed in the residence state. Art. 
10(2), however, states that the dividends may also be taxed in the source state, but if the 
beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the residence state, there is a maximum limit 
to the taxes charged: no more than 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the 
beneficial owner is a company that holds directly at least 25 per cent of the payer’s capital; and 
no more than 15 per cent of the dividends in all other cases.74 As a starting point, in a simple 
case with only two states involved, there are thus two options, and the end result depends on 
the circumstances.  
The source state has to apply the conditions of the treaty between the source and the residence 
states. Its taxing rights are thus limited, if it has any, and they are only a maximum of 5 or 15 
per cent of the gross amount of dividends. 
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The treaty concerning the PE state is the one between the residence state and the PE state. Here 
Article 10 doesn’t resolve allocation of taxing rights, because the PE is not a resident. 
Therefore, the provisions of Article 21 about ‘other income’ would apply. Article 21, however, 
refers PE cases back to Article 7, which is about business profits.75 According to Art. 7(1), the 
profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment shall be taxed in the PE state.76 Due 
to the non-discrimination article of the treaty, the PE state might have to grant relief for tax 
paid in the source state.77 The non-discrimination article, which is Article 24 of the OECD 
MTC, provides that the taxation of a PE of an enterprise in a contracting state shall not receive 
less favourable treatment than an enterprise that carries on the same activities in that state.78 
The residence state is the one that has to apply provisions of both of the treaties involved. Based 
on what has been stated earlier, the treaty that it has with the source state would allocate the 
taxing rights to one or the other; and according to the treaty with the PE state, the PE state 
would be the one imposing the tax on dividends. Regarding the treaty between the residence 
state and the source state, the residence state will have to provide credit relief according to the 
OECD MTC Art. 23 A (2) regardless of what is stated in the tax treaty. Under the treaty 
between the residence state and the PE state, the residence state will also have to provide relief. 
The relief method now depends on the treaty.79  
The end result concerning taxation of dividends in PE triangular cases is that tax can, in 
practice, be imposed in all of the three states. The residence state must, however, provide relief 
for tax paid in the other two states. It is possible that the residence state ends up imposing no 
tax on the dividends after tax crediting or exemption. The PE state might also have to provide 
relief for tax paid in the source state.80  
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6.2.2 Interest 
The basic case with interest income is similar to that of dividends: Article 11 para 1 states that 
interest arising in a contracting state and paid to a resident in another contracting state is subject 
to tax in the residence state. Further, an option of taxing the interest income in the source state 
is provided, but the option is subject to restrictions. According to Art. 11(2), in case the 
beneficial owner of the interest is a resident of the residence state, the tax imposed shall not 
exceed 10 per cent of the gross amount of the interest.81  
Based on what is stated above, the source state either gives up its taxing right and the tax is 
imposed in the residence state, or imposes a tax of no more than 10 per cent of the gross interest. 
The tax rate is negotiated between the contracting states, and, according to Fett82, this rate is a 
common point of negotiation in tax treaties. 
The PE state should apply the conditions of the treaty that it has with the residence state. 
Similarly to provisions about dividends, here Article 7 about business profits applies, and 
according to Article 7 the PE state is the one that is entitled to impose tax on the interest. Article 
7 applies because the provisions of Article 11 presume that the interest arises in that other state, 
and here, according to the definition from Art. 11(5), the interest income doesn’t, apart from 
some exceptions, arise in the PE state. Again, the non-discrimination article may provide that 
the PE state grants relief for the tax imposed in the source state.83  
In the residence state both the treaty with the source state as well as the PE state shall apply. 
The treaty with the source state provides that the residence state shall relieve the income for 
the tax imposed in the source state. If the income falls under Article 11, the residence state shall 
provide relief using the credit method even if the general method in the treaty is exemption 
method. Regarding the treaty between the residence state and the PE state, the terms of the 
treaty define the relief method, but the residence state must either exempt or credit the tax paid 
in the PE state. It is possible that the residence state ends up both crediting the tax paid in the 
source state and providing relief in one form or the other for the tax paid in the PE state. This, 
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however, might not fully prevent unrelieved double taxation as the relief provided may not be 
sufficient.84  
The outcome in the case of interest income in triangular cases is, similarly to the dividends 
case, that tax may be imposed in all of the three states. The residence state will, however, have 
to provide relief with regards to tax imposed in both the source state and the PE state. The PE 
state might also have to provide relief due to the provisions of the non-discrimination article.85   
6.2.3 Royalties 
In a typical royalties triangular case royalties arise in the source state, are paid to a resident in 
the residence state and are attributable to a PE in the PE state. Under the OECD MTC article 
12, taxing rights of royalties are primarily assigned to the residence state. Many tax treaties, 
however, allow taxation at source but with a percentage limit. If tax at source is allowed in the 
treaty, the result is similar to the dividends and the interest cases, i.e. tax could generally be 
imposed in all of the three states.86 A case like this is not discussed in the following as the result 
is already discussed in the previous sections. Only the cases similar to the OECD MTC are 
looked at.  
The OECD MTC article 12 reads as follows: “Royalties arising in a Contracting State and 
beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that 
other State.”87 Therefore, the source state is not allowed to impose tax at source. 
The PE state applies the provisions of the treaty that it has with the residence state. As the 
royalties do not arise in the PE or the residence state, article 12 does not apply. As with dividend 
and interest income, here too article 7 would apply and the PE state could impose tax based on 
the profit attributable to the PE. In a case where no tax is imposed in the source state, the PE 
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state has no obligation to provide relief under article 24(3) of the treaty that it has with the 
residence state.88  
The residence state has to apply the conditions of the treaties that it has with the source and the 
PE state. As the source state is not allowed to impose tax at source, the residence state has no 
obligation to provide relief. It will, however, have to provide relief in the form of exemption 
or credit according to the treaty that it has with the PE state.89 
The result is that, where the treaty follows the OECD MTC, the source state is prevented from 
imposing tax on the royalty income. Tax can be imposed in both the PE and the residence state, 
but the residence state will have to provide relief. Thus no unrelieved double taxation arises.90  
6.3 Problems Caused by Triangular Cases 
There are two significant problems caused by triangular cases. One problem is the double 
taxation of income that can occur since bilateral treaties are not created to resolve trilateral 
situations. Trying to resolve this has, however, led to tax planning and artificial structures that 
try to take advantage of the solutions created for relieving double taxation. Out of these two, 
the latter has probably gotten more attention recently as the OECD BEPS programme Action 
6 focuses on preventing treaty abuse, and as a part of that action it is supposed to create an anti-
abuse rule for permanent establishments situated in third States.91 
6.3.1 Unrelieved Double Taxation 
Without any relief methods in any of the three countries involved in a triangular case, income 
could be taxed in all of the three states. This, of course, is a problem from the point of view of 
efficient international business, and it is often avoided by relieving the income from tax in one 
or two of the states. Even with relief methods the income can be double taxed, but defining 
double taxation in multilateral cases is not as straightforward as it is in bilateral cases. 
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If only the residence state exempts the income from tax, the income is not considered fully 
relieved as it is still taxed in both the source state and the residence state. It is, however, possible 
that the tax paid in the two states is in aggregate lower that it would have been were the tax 
imposed only in the residence state. It is noteworthy that had the tax been credited in the 
residence state, it would have been possible to credit the double tax in total, in which case one 
could consider that double taxation was prevented. As the outcome is more or less the same 
regardless of whether the exemption or credit method is used, it does not seem reasonable to 
state that one method prevents double taxation whereas the other one doesn’t. Even so, one can 
hardly consider the taxation relieved if it’s compared to a bilateral situation where the residence 
state is no longer involved: if there are two states, that is, the source state and the PE state left, 
and both impose tax on the income, there is no relief whatsoever present.92  
Based on the above, it could be concluded that in triangular cases unrelieved double taxation 
occurs only in cases where the overall tax burden with regard to an item of income is higher 
than the highest of the applicable tax rates amongst the three states involved.93 Still, according 
to the OECD definition of double taxation, international double taxation occurs when 
“comparable taxes are imposed in two or more states --"94, and if this definition is taken 
literally, the above alternative definition is not valid.  
6.3.2 Treaty Abuse 
In a triangular situation, the starting point is that all the three states involved have the right to 
exercise their taxing powers, which can potentially lead to triple taxation. In some cases, 
however, it is possible for taxpayers to exploit the shortcomings of bilateral tax treaties and 
thus achieve low overall taxation or even double non-taxation.95 
A possible triangular tax avoidance scheme is such that there is an enterprise in the residence 
state carrying on business through a PE in the PE state. The enterprise receives income from a 
source state, and that income is attributable to the PE in the PE state that is a low-tax jurisdiction 
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or offers special tax privileges to certain types of income. Without tax treaties the source state 
would levy a withholding tax on the income, whereas the residence state would have worldwide 
taxing rights as regards its residents. The treaty between the residence state and the source state 
would, however, oblige the source state to lower the tax at source or forego it altogether. 
Further, the treaty between the residence state and the PE state possibly obliges the residence 
state to exempt the income attributable to the PE. Thus the only tax levied on the income would 
be that of the PE state. The non-discrimination provision might even oblige the PE state to 
credit for the taxes levied in the source state. As a result, the income will either be taxed at a 
very low rate or not at all (see picture 2).96 
 
 
There are two alternative schemes of how the above mentioned tax avoidance is planned. One 
scheme bases on the kind where an enterprise in the residence state receives income from the 
source state – an ordinary scheme as such.  The enterprise might, however, for tax purposes 
have an incentive to transfer assets and thus income to a PE in a third state. The PE could be 
established for tax purposes solely, and the PE state would in this case be one that either offers 
a low tax rate or a favourable treatment for certain types of income, namely when the tax treaty 
between the two countries provides for the exemption method. In a scheme like this, the source 
state does not lose tax revenue as the situation from its standpoint is no different compared to 
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a situation where the income is simply attributable to the enterprise in the residence state. The 
residence state is the one that loses tax revenue when it exempts the income from tax based on 
the fact that the income is attributable to the PE. Artificial structures like this distort 
competition as an enterprise that has not established a PE in a third country will end up paying 
a higher tax rate and might thus be less profitable compares to the one that has created a scheme 
like the one described.97 
The other scheme is more harmful for the source state and not so much for the residence state. 
Here an enterprise is originally resident in the PE state. The PE state is a low-tax jurisdiction 
or provides beneficial tax treatment for certain kinds of income, but the source state does not 
provide treaty benefits and applies high withholding tax rates. The enterprise shifts its residence 
to a third state, which is now the residence state, but maintains a PE in the PE state, where the 
income is still attributable. The shift makes the source state obliged to apply the conditions of 
the treaty between the source state and the residence state, and, as a result, the source state can 
no longer levy the same tax on the income. The residence state has exemption obligation under 
the treaty it has with the PE state, so it can’t tax the income, but it is doubtful whether the 
source state should now grant the treaty benefits that follow from the treaty it has with the 
residence state.98 
The OECD MTC Commentary on Article 24 para 3 takes the abusive structures into account. 
It recognizes the fact that in some cases the income may not be taxed in any of the three states 
and recommends including a provision in the treaty between the source state and the residence 
state that denies treaty benefits in the income is not taxed normally in the PE state. 
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7 Provisions Concerning Triangular Cases in Finland 
EU tax law is a relevant part of the international tax law of Finland. The EU tax law has an 
effect on tax treatment that is based on pure domestic tax law and tax treaties if the tax object 
or subject is connected with Finland and another EU or EEA Member State.99 EU tax law is, 
however, the same across the EU, so there is no need to discuss EU tax law or directives in this 
chapter as they have been discussed earlier. Instead, the focus in the following paragraphs is 
on characteristics and details about Finnish international tax law and tax treaties concluded by 
Finland.  
7.1 Domestic International Tax Law  
The foundation for the Finnish international tax law is in the national tax law rules regarding 
cross-border economic relations. These rules aim at securing Finland’s taxing powers in cross-
border situations and at limiting international double taxation.100 
There are two kinds of domestic law rules in Finland that apply to cross-border situations. 
There are rules that apply to cross-border situations only, which are, for instance, included in 
the Income Tax Act (Tuloverolaki, TVL) and in the Act on the Taxation of Income of a Person 
Subject to Limited Tax Liability (LähdeVL). There are also rules that apply to both cross-
border and domestic situations, such as the general anti-avoidance provision of the Act on 
Assessment Procedure (VML).101 
Tax Liability 
According to TVL 9.2 § a resident taxable on their worldwide income in Finland is a person, a 
Finnish corporation, a joint administration and an estate of a deceased person when they have 
resided in Finland during the tax year. They are liable to pay tax on the income that they have 
received both in Finland and outside Finland. A non-resident with limited tax liability is a 
person that has not resided in Finland during the tax year and a foreign corporation on the 
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income that is paid from Finland. A person with limited tax liability only pays tax to Finland 
on income that arises in Finland.102 As regards permanent establishments, a foreign company 
with a PE in Finland must, as a rule, pay tax on all income attributable to the PE.103 The question 
of whether one has tax liability on their worldwide income or limited tax liability in Finland is 
resolved according to Finnish tax law, and any possible tax treaty provisions regarding this 
matter are insignificant. International tax treaties may and do, however, limit Finland’s taxing 
power with respect to both groups. In case a tax treaty has not been concluded between Finland 
and the domicile country of a foreign entity, Finland’s taxing rights are determined by national 
tax rules. 104 
A corporation with limited tax liability is one that is registered outside Finland. If the is no 
obligation to register the corporation, it is considered foreign when its management is abroad. 
There are, however, situations where, for example, a corporation is registered in a state that can 
be considered a tax haven but all its operations and management are run in Finland. In cases 
like this there may be sufficient reason for the corporation to be considered Finnish or to at 
least have a PE in Finland.105  
Elimination of Double Taxation 
The elimination of double taxation in Finland is based on the Finnish Act on Elimination of 
International Double Taxation (Laki kansainvälisen kaksinkertaisen verotuksen poistamisesta, 
MenetelmäL), although where a tax treaty has been concluded in a cross-border situation, 
double taxation is, as regards the elimination method, eliminated according to the provisions 
of the treaty. The law applies to Finnish income tax, corporate taxes, municipal taxes and 
church taxes.106 
Accoding to MenetelmäL 2 §, international double taxation is, unless otherwise provided by a 
tax treaty or another domestic law provision, eliminated by using credit method. Primarily only 
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foreign state taxes are creditable. The credit may not be more than the amount of the total taxes 
payable for the same income in Finland. Furthermore, credit is not provided for tax exempt 
income, with the exception that foreign taxes paid on dividends that are partly tax exempt in 
Finland may be creditable. In general, a tax payer may be granted tax credit only for their own 
taxes. It should, however, be noted that the foreign taxes paid by a Finnish resident company 
are creditable with respect to its foreign-based PE.107 
As regards international economic double taxation and direct investment dividends paid 
between a Finnish corporation and one in another Member State or tax treaty state, the 
elimination of double taxation is based on tax treaties, EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 
Finnish domestic tax law. In cross-border direct investment dividends, the exemption method 
is applied in Finland.  If there is no tax treaty between Finland and the other country, the 
dividends are often subject to international economic double taxation. Most portfolio dividends 
are, likewise, most often double taxed.108 
7.1.1 Provisions on Dividends  
Dividend taxation is based on domestic tax laws, tax treaties and the EU Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive. The taxation may vary depending on whether portfolio or direct investment 
dividends109 are concerned.110  
Finland treats cross-border dividends differently from domestic dividends, and cross-border 
dividends are generally subject to more tax than domestic ones. In non-treaty situations only 
international juridical taxation is eliminated. The case is fairly similar with tax treaty situations 
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when portfolio dividends are concerned. Both juridical and economic taxation are eliminated 
only in EU and tax treaty cases and mainly with respect to direct investment dividends.111 
Finnish-Source Dividends of Non-Residents 
According to TVL 10.6 §, dividend is considered income that is sourced in Finland when it is 
received from a Finnish limited liability company (osakeyhtiö). If the dividend payment is paid 
to a non-resident and is not exempted, then it is normally subject to withholding tax in Finland. 
For corporate entities the withholding tax would be 20 % unless otherwise specified by a tax 
treaty or LähdeVL 3.5 §, 3.6 § or 7.1.3 §. According to 3.5 §, no tax is withheld if the non-
resident dividend recipient is comparable to a Finnish corporate entity112 and the dividend 
would be tax exempt in a domestic situation. There is, however, a requirement of impossibility 
of full credit in the Residence State that has to be fulfilled in order to withholding tax 
exemption.113 
LähdeVL 3.6 § provides that if dividends fall within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, Finland is not allowed to levy withholding tax. In these cases, the Residence State 
must also exempt the dividends. The Directive provides an option for the Member States to 
apply a minimum holding period of two years as a requirement for the application of the 
Directive. This condition has, however, not been implemented in the Finnish domestic law.114  
According to LähdeVL 7.1.3 §, if the dividends are paid to a corporate entity resident in a EEA 
State, it may be subject to a 15 % withholding tax, which is the same as the tax of a resident 
company. This would be when the Parent-Subsidiary Directive doesn’t apply and the shares of 
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the dividend distributing company are considered investment assets115 of the recipient 
company.116 
In tax treaty situations it is often the case that the withholding tax rate is much lower than what 
it would be based on domestic laws. Common tax rates that are applied are a 15 % rate for 
portfolio dividends and a 0 % to 5 % rate for direct investment dividends. The definition of a 
direct investment varies depending on the tax treaty in question, but it generally requires a 25 % 
holding of the Finnish company’s capital or a 10 % holding of the voting rights.117 
If a foreign corporate entity has a permanent establishment in Finland, it is subject to tax in 
Finland on all foreign-source and Finnish-source income connected with the PE. All the PE 
income is taxed according to VML and for corporate entities the applicable tax rate is 20 %. 
The treatment is the same in treaty situations unless the treaty otherwise provides. Treaties 
based on the OECD Model give the PE state unlimited taxing rights with respect to dividends 
if the holding is effectively connected with a PE of the dividend recipient in the residence state 
of the dividend-distributing company. Finnish-source dividends are thus taxed as a part of the 
PE‘s income. If the dividend recipient is a EU or treaty state resident, the non-discrimination 
requirements must be taken into account as the tax treatment of the PE shall not be less 
favourable than that of Finnish resident companies.  Therefore, the dividends have to be divided 
into taxable and tax exempt dividends in the same manner as with Finnish residents.118 
Foreign-Source Dividends of Non-Residents 
If no tax treaty has been concluded with the residence state, Finland does not tax the foreign-
source dividends of non-residents unless they are effectively connected with a PE in Finland, 
i.e. in triangular situations. In these cases, the PE’s dividends are taxed as part of the PE’s 
income, similarly to Finnish-source dividends connected with a PE in Finland. This also applies 
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if Finland has a tax treaty with the source state but not with the residence state. In a triangular 
case the source state and the residence state may also levy tax on the dividend according to 
their domestic laws, which might, as has been stated earlier, lead to double taxation. In Finland, 
taxpayers should be entitled to tax credit at least with regard to the tax in the source state. 
MenetelmäL allows for the foreign tax to be deducted from the Finnish tax on the same 
income.119 
When there is no treaty between Finland and the source state, the treatment is similar to the 
treatment described in the previous paragraph. The treatment depends on the articles 
concerning other income or business income in the tax treaty that has been concluded with the 
residence state. Finland may tax the dividends as long as there is no offense against the non-
discrimination rules. Due to non-discrimination principles, Finland may have to grant tax credit  
with respect to dividend tax levied in the source state as it does with Finnish residents.120 
When a tax treaty between Finland and both the Source as well as the residence state exists, 
the treaty between Finland and the source state determines whether Finland may tax the 
dividend attributable to the PE in Finland. Finland is given the taxing right in articles 
concerning other income or business income. In principle, the source state and the residence 
state may also have taxing rights, which is why elimination of double taxation is important. It 
is, however, likely that similarly to the Saint-Gobain case, in these cases Finland has to provide 
tax credit in the same way as for Finnish residents. Also, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
requires tax exemption when the companies involved are covered by the Directive.121 
Foreign-Source Dividends of Finnish Residents 
When dividends are received by Finnish corporate entities, they are most often tax exempt in 
Finland. One case where dividends are tax exempt is when the companies fall under the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. Other than that, the Finnish Business Income Tax Act (Laki 
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elinkeinotulon verottamisesta, EVL) 6a § provides that dividends are tax exempt even if they 
don’t fall under the scope of the Directive when they are paid by a company resident in the 
EEA and fulfil certain requirements provided by the law. Firstly, the dividend payer must be 
liable to at least 10 per cent tax on its profits without a possibility of these profits being tax 
exempt. Further, the paying company must be resident in a EEA State for tax purposes, and it 
shall not be a resident outside the EEA.122 
Direct investment dividends are also often tax exempt in Finland even if they are paid from 
outside the EEA. The tax exemption stems from tax treaty provisions that usually require a 25 
per cent capital or 10 per cent voting rights holding. Direct investment dividends receive from 
non-EU treaty countries are subject to low, often 5 per cent, or no tax at source depending on 
the applicable treaty. Portfolio dividends are, however, often subject to higher withholding tax 
even within the EU.123 
The tax exemption of EVL 6a § shall not apply if the dividend is deductible to its payer. The 
purpose of tax exemption is often avoiding double taxation, but it doesn’t aim at double non-
taxation that might be raised especially with hybrid instruments. The dividend is also not tax 
exempt if it is a relates to a tax avoidance arrangement or series of arrangements that are not 
genuine but rather have been put into place in order to obtain tax advantage.124 
The dividends that do not fall under any provision providing partial or full tax exemption are 
either partly or fully taxable in Finland. Fully taxable dividends, such as ones from non-treaty 
countries excluding EEA countries, are subject to 20 percent tax. Dividend is also fully taxable 
if it is paid by a listed company and the recipient is not listed and doesn’t hold at least 10 per 
cent of the distributing company’s shares. Partial taxation concerns, for example, situations 
where the dividend is received based on investment asset shares and the payer is covered by 
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the Parent-Subsidiary Directive but the 10 per cent holding requirement is not met. In these 
cases, 75 per cent of the dividend is taxable.125 
Dividends from abroad may be subject to source state taxation. If there is no treaty between 
Finland and the source state, the tax at source depends on that state’s domestic law. If a treaty 
exists, the taxing rights at source are often limited, and usually to 15 per cent.126 
7.1.2 Provisions on Interest Income 
Interest income is, according to TVL 10.7 §, considered income received from Finland when 
the debtor is a person resident in Finland or a Finnish corporation, partnership, joint 
administration or estate of a deceased person.  
In general, a person with limited tax liability pays tax in Finland only on income that arises in 
Finland. Having income arising in Finland does, however, not always mean that the income is 
taxed in Finland. Tax treaties often provide exceptions to this rule, but one exception 
concerning interest income arises from TVL. According to TVL 9.2 § even if interest arises in 
Finland, interest income paid for non-residents on, for example, bonds, debentures and bank 
accounts deposits is tax exempt. A non-resident with limited tax liability is, however, liable to 
pay tax to Finland on interest income that is attributable to its permanent establishment in 
Finland.127 
Interest of Non-Residents 
When a non-resident has a permanent establishment in Finland, it is liable to pay tax for both 
the domestic-source and the foreign-source interest connected with the PE. According to TVL 
9.3 § the interest is taxable even if it is normally tax exempt for non-residents. The interest 
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received by a PE is taxed according to the domestic laws of the PE state as a part of the PE’s 
business profits. International double taxation should be eliminated in the residence state.128 
Foreign-Source Interest of Finnish Residents 
Interest income received from outside Finland is taxable in Finland in the same way as domestic 
interest income. The income is subject to corporate tax. International double taxation is 
eliminated in Finland by crediting the tax paid at source even if the interest is connected with 
a foreign PE of the Finnish resident, unless otherwise provided by a tax treaty.129 
7.1.3 Provisions on Royalties 
According to TVL 10.8 § royalty payment arises in Finland if the property or right that the 
payment is based on is used in Finland or if the one liable to pay is a person resident in Finland 
or a Finnish corporation, partnership, joint administration or estate of a deceased person. 
Royalties of Non-Residents 
Similarly to interest income treatment, royalty income is taxed in Finland when it’s connected 
with a PE in Finland. The taxation of all the income connected with a PE is carried out by 
assessment. The income is subject to a 20 per cent income tax.130 
Foreign-Source Royalties of Finnish Residents 
Even if a royalty of a Finnish resident is connected with a PE that is located abroad, the royalty 
is taxable in Finland. The tax paid in the PE state is, however, creditable in Finland according 
to the provisions of MenetelmäL, but also based on most tax treaties. Only few treaties require 
the exemption method to be used.131 
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7.2 Tax treaties  
Finland has concluded income tax treaties with over sixty states. The only multilateral treaty is 
the Nordic multilateral treaty that has been discussed earlier. All other treaties are bilateral. 
The tax treaties are based on the OECD MTC, albeit the treaties concluded with developing 
countries may include characteristics of the UN Model Tax Convention.132 As the majority of 
Finland’s tax treaties is based on OECD MTC, the OECD membership of the other treaty party 
is insignificant. In cases where tax treaties require interpretation, the Finnish Tax 
Administration bases their interpretation on the OECD Commentary.133  
Due to the golden rule of tax treaties, the treaties may restrict Finland’s taxing rights but they 
can’t extend them. Therefore, it is not possible to collect tax based on national tax rules when 
a tax treaty applies, unless the provisions of the tax treaty comply with the national tax rules.134 
Elimination of Double Taxation 
Article 23 defines the methods of elimination of double taxation. In tax treaties, two different 
expressions regarding taxing rights are used: either that the income may be taxed in that other 
state, or that the income shall be taxable only in that other state. These expressions are used to 
indicate the residence state elimination methods. Where the source state taxing rights are 
described with the latter expression, the residence state always eliminates double taxation by 
using the exemption method. Where the first expression is used, one or the other elimination 
method is used depending on which is the main method in the treaty. 135 
Nowadays the main method in all tax treaties concluded by Finland is, as a rule, the credit 
method. There are a few exceptions, such as Spain and France, where the main method is the 
exemption method, but in these treaties the method regarding dividend, interest and royalty 
payments is, nonetheless, the credit method. As there might be decades between the first and 
the latest tax treaties concluded by Finland, there are differences in how matters are expressed 
in tax treaties. Regardless of different phrasings in Finland’s tax treaties concerning the 
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elimination methods, the aim in the treaties is the same: there are two different methods, one 
of which exempts and the other one credits the tax. 136   
Permanent Establishments 
Even though in intra-EU situations non-discrimination is already a requirement as a 
consequence of the EU tax law, all of Finland’s tax treaties also explicitly require that the tax 
treatment of a PE of an enterprise of the other contracting state shall not be less favourable than 
the tax treatment of an enterprise carrying on the same activities. The requirement applies both 
ways: a Finnish enterprise with a PE in the other contracting state shall not receive less 
favourable tax treatment than a local enterprise.137 
                                                
136 Verohallinto 2015: 159 
137 Helminen 2016: Fundamentals of international tax law > Basic Principles of International Tax Law > Non-
discrimination > Tax Treaties > Permanent Establishment 
41 
 
8 Example Case: A Nordic Situation 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an example of how triangular cases could be handled 
in Finland. As has been stated before, there is a multilateral treaty between the Nordic 
countries: Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In the example 
it is assumed that all the parties are located in the Nordics and in the EU, so the states would 
be Finland, Sweden and Denmark. There are three different scenarios from the point of view 
of Finland that are looked at. These are Finland as a source state, Finland as a residence state 
and Finland as a PE state.  
The results of the Nordic case would, apart from details such as tax rates, apply in many other 
cases, too, since most of Finland’s tax treaties are based on the OECD model and are thus, in 
terms of content, rather similar. Nevertheless, differences in end results may occur, for 
example, due to directives that only apply within the EU. Further, as all other tax treaties 
concluded by Finland are bilateral, it requires an analysis of each treaty separately to confirm 
the tax treatment, and an extensive analysis like this is not in the scope of this thesis. 
No analysis is made about the definition of, for example, permanent establishment, but it is 
assumed that the PEs are PEs as they are per the tax treaty. It is also assumed that a PE is not a 
resident and the treaty between the source state and the PE state doesn’t apply.  
Dividends in the Nordic Treaty 
Article 10 of the Nordic Treaty describes the dividend taxation and, according to Art. 10(3), 
dividends paid by a resident on one contracting state to a person in another contracting state 
may be taxed in the recipient’s residence state. In these cases, the source state may not withhold 
more than 15 % of the gross dividend, and the provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
shall also be taken into account. Article 10(3), however, only applies to cross-border dividends 
paid between residents of the contracting states, and notwithstanding the provisions of Article 
10(3), the provisions of Art. 10(2) may be applied in triangular cases.138  
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According to Article 10(2) of the Nordic Treaty, if the beneficial owner of the dividend is a 
resident in one of the contracting states and the dividend is attributable to the owner’s PE in 
another state, the taxation is subject to provisions of Articles 7 and 14 of the Treaty. Since 
Article 14 concerns income received by a natural person, it is irrelevant for the purposes of this 
thesis. As a consequence of the application of Article 7 about business income, the dividend 
may be taxed in the PE state. This doesn’t apply when dividends are paid by a resident of a 
state other than one of the contracting states, nor does it apply if dividends are paid between 
residents of the same state even if the PE is situated in a third state.139 
If the beneficial owner of the dividend is resident in one of the contracting states and has a PE 
in another, the PE state may be the only state that has taxing rights in the setting. The source 
state has no taxing rights unless it’s the same as the PE State. The residence state may tax the 
dividend, but it must grant tax credit according to Art. 25 of the Treaty. As the PE state has 
unlimited taxing rights, the taxing rights of the residence state after the credit are limited. 140 
It should be noted that if the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies, it may prevent the PE state 
from taxing the dividend. When the source state and the residence state are within the scope of 
the Directive, it applies for their part even if the PE state is situated outside the EU. The PE 
state is, however, under no obligation to follow the Directive.141 
Interest & Royalties in the Nordic Treaty 
The articles concerning interest and royalty income are Articles 11 and 12. Like with dividend 
provisions, here, too, Article 7 is applicable. The tax treatment of dividends is similar to that 
of interest and royalties. 
For dividends, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive may affect the taxation, and for interest and 
royalties, special attention shall be given to the Interest and Royalties Directive. If this directive 
applies, income is taxable only in the PE state. 
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8.1 Role 1: Finland as Source State 
When Finland is the source state (see picture 3), the income is paid from Finland to the PE 
state. From Finland’s point of view, the relevant question is taxation at source: is Finland 
allowed to levy tax at source, and if it is, at what rate? 
 
 
If this situation were the classical triangular case, the question would be about the tax treaty 
that should be applied: should it be the one between Finland and Denmark as the income is 
paid to a Danish resident, or the one between Finland and Sweden as the income is in fact 
attributable to the PE in Sweden? This matter was discussed in chapter 6.2 and as a rule it could 
be stated that the source state should apply the conditions of the treaty that it has with the 
residence state. Thus, if Finland had separate treaties with Denmark and Sweden, it would, as 
a starting point, have to apply the treaty that it has with Denmark. However, since this treaty is 
multilateral, this problem does not occur. 
If there was no PE involved and the dividends were to be paid from the source state to the 
residence state and not distributed further, the Nordic Tax Treaty would allow for taxation in 
the source state and the residence state. In the source state the tax rate shall not exceed 15 per 
cent of the dividend amount if the recipient is a resident of a contracting state.  If the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive applies, that is, the recipient is a company that possesses at least 10 per 
cent of the equity of the dividend distributing company, the dividend is exempted from tax 
altogether and the source state has no right to tax the dividend. 
PE	State	
Sweden
Residence	State	
Denmark
Source	State	
Finland
Dividend,	
interest	or	
royalty	
Picture 3. Finland as source state 
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If interest or royalty is paid from the source state to the owner of the income in the residence 
state without a PE involved, the income shall only be taxed in the recipient state. The OECD 
MTC would allow for limited taxation in the source state, too, which the Nordic Treaty does 
not do, except for in certain cases where the interest is connected with a PE or fixed base therein 
and the source state is the same as the PE state.142  
When, however, the dividend, interest or royalty payments are distributed to a PE in a third 
contracting state like in the example, the taxing rights differ from the situation in which the 
income remains in the residence state: the taxing rights are divided according to the business 
profits article of the treaty. As a result, the source state has no taxing rights. The residence state 
can have taxing rights in certain situations, but in most cases the PE state may be the only state 
that taxes the income and it has unlimited taxing rights. These situations are looked at in more 
detail in the further paragraphs of this chapter.  
It should be noted that for dividends, the above mentioned application includes a requirement 
of the shareholding that the payment is effectively connected with the business carried on 
through the permanent establishment. This could, for instance, mean that the shares are 
regarded to be property of the PE. The same requirement of being effectively connected applies 
to interest payments, where it would mean that the debt-claim must be genuinely connected to 
the business, and the economic ownership of the debt-claim must thus be allocated to the PE.143 
To conclude, when Finland is the source state, it does not have taxing rights and it is not given 
any by the power of EU directives or EU tax law. Therefore, it has no taxing rights with regard 
to dividend, interest or royalty income. The only scenario when Finland would have taxing 
rights would be one where Finland would have a double role, i.e. it would be both the source 
state and the PE state. 
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8.2 Role 2: Finland as Residence State  
When Finland is the residence state (see picture 4), the focus is on the elimination of double 
taxation: should Finland credit tax paid elsewhere or exempt the income from tax altogether? 
 
 
The PE state, which in this case would be Sweden, has unlimited taxing rights in a case like 
this. The residence state, Finland, however, has the possibility of levying tax on the income, 
but as per Art. 25 of the Nordic Treaty, it has to grant a tax credit for the taxes levied in the PE 
state. As the PE state has unlimited taxing rights, the residence state has only limited taxing 
rights after the credit. Since the income is not taxed in the source state, Denmark, no credit 
with respect to source state taxation is necessary. The same treatment applies to dividends, 
interest and royalties. 144 
If the Parent-Subsidiary Directive or the Interest and Royalty Directive applies, there is a parent 
company in Finland, a subsidiary in Denmark and a PE of the parent company in Sweden (see 
picture 5). The Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies if the parent company in Finland holds 10 
per cent of the capital of the subsidiary in Denmark, they are subject to corporate taxes and 
take forms listed in the annex of the Directive. If the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies, 
dividend distributions shall be fully exempted from tax, so Finland has no taxing powers.  
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The application of the Interest and Royalty Directive also presumes a certain company form, 
tax residency in a Member State and liability to corporate tax in the EU. The Nordic Treaty 
itself already prevents taxation at source, but if it didn’t, then the I+R Directive would. When 
the Directive applies, Sweden shall tax the PE, but Finland may tax the PE income as a part of 
the parent company’s income. It must, however, grant relief for tax that the PE has paid in 
Sweden.  
 
 
So when Finland is the residence state, it has limited taxing rights as it must grant relief for the 
taxes levied in the PE state. This applies in a basic triangular case as well as in a case where 
the I+R Directive applies. 
8.3 Role 3: Finland as PE State 
If Finland takes the role of the PE state (see picture 6), it should again focus on the elimination 
of double taxation: should Finland tax the income, credit tax paid elsewhere or exempt the 
income from tax? Generally, it is the PE state that has the taxing rights in a triangular case like 
this. Whether it is dividend, interest or royalty income, the PE state is the one that has unlimited 
taxing rights. When Finland is the PE state, the income is taxed according to Finnish laws. 
PE	in
PE	State	
Sweden
Parent	in	
Residence	State	
Finland
Subsidiary	in	
Source	State	
Denmark
Dividend,	
interest	or	
royalty	
Picture 5. The parent-subsidiary directive or interest and royalty directive applies 
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If the Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies, Finland as the PE state shall exempt the profit 
distribution from tax. If the Interest and Royalty Directive applies, the income shall be taxable 
in Finland, and when the parent in the residence state taxes the PE’s income, it shall grant relief 
for tax that the PE has paid in Finland. This, however, does not affect Finland’s taxing rights 
on a practical level. 
The non-discrimination principle should be noted in all cases. The Nordic Treaty provides that 
the taxation of a PE shall not be less favourable than the taxation of resident companies carrying 
on the same activities, so if a situation like this were to occur, the non-discrimination principle 
were to take precedence over what has been stated earlier. This is also required by the TFEU 
freedoms, especially the freedom of establishment.145  
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8.4 Conclusions on Different Roles and Types of Income 
The differences regarding the taxation of dividend, interest and royalty income are small (see 
table 1), because in triangular cases all three income types fall under the scope of Article 7 
about business income. The main difference is caused by the directives that may alter taxing 
rights if the directives apply. 
 
Income Type
Finland’s Role Dividend Interest Royalty
Source State No taxing rights. No taxing rights. No taxing rights.
Residence State Limited taxing rights; 
obligation to credit tax 
paid in PE State. 
No taxing rights if the 
P-S Directive applies.
Limited taxing rights; 
obligation to credit tax paid 
in PE State. 
If the I+R Directive applies, 
may tax PE income as part 
of parent’s income but must 
grant relief.
Limited taxing rights; 
obligation to credit tax paid 
in PE State. 
If the I+R Directive applies, 
may tax PE income as part 
of parent’s income but must 
grant relief.
PE State Unlimited taxing 
rights; taxed according 
to Finnish laws.
No taxing rights if the 
P-S Directive applies.
Unlimited taxing rights; 
taxed according to Finnish 
laws.
Unlimited taxing rights; 
taxed according to Finnish 
laws.
Table 1. Summary of taxing rights in the example case 
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9 Triangular Cases in BEPS Action Plan 
BEPS Action plan contains fifteen actions that together aim at tackling current inconsistencies 
and other problems within international tax legislation that lead to aggressive tax planning and 
artificial company structures. As a result of the Action plan, the OECD plans to update its 
Model Convention, which will then have an impact on treaty abuse.   
Triangular cases have been taken into account in the OECD Commentary since 1992, when it 
was recognized that certain benefits should be denied in triangular cases if the income 
attributable to the PE is not taxed normally. This was a start, but the vague expression normal 
left the Commentary open to interpretations.146  
Anti-abuse clauses regarding triangular cases were introduced in the US treaty practice in the 
early 1990s. The first anti-abuse provision was present in the US-Netherlands treaty in 1993, 
and since then anti-abuse provisions have been a part of US treaties concluded with states that 
use the exemption method. They are, however, not included in the US Model Convention. In 
addition to treaties concluded by the US, a specific triangular provision is present in only four 
separate tax treaties.147 
9.1 Actions That Have an Impact on Triangular Cases 
BEPS will have an effect on triangular cases in many ways. Some changes will impact 
triangular cases that are used to obtain treaty benefits, whereas others will alter the 
circumstances that lead to triangular cases. For the purposes of this thesis, only two of the 
actions that are seen to be most relevant with respect to triangular cases are looked at in the 
following paragraphs. Out of these two, Action 6 is the one that is most relevant with respect 
to triangular cases, but Action 15 actually provides the end result and the implementation 
method of Action 6 results. Action 15 is looked at in more detail when the implementation of  
the changes is discussed. It must, however, be noted, that the BEPS Action Plan is a coherent 
whole, and the other 13 actions might as well, in their part, affect triangular cases. 
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In the BEPS project, treaty abuse and treaty shopping are considered to be amongst the most 
severe problems that it aims to tackle. This is why action 6, Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, was created. Treaty abusers and shoppers make use 
of tax benefits that are not intended to be granted in their situations, and this is rarely in the 
interest of the contracting states whose tax treaties are being taken advantage of.148  
One of the situations where a person seeks to circumvent treaty limitations is a triangular 
situation. Therefore, Action 6 has its separate section to deal with the problem. This section is 
called Anti-abuse rule for permanent establishments situated in third States. The report on 
Action 6 states that currently in the OECD MTC Commentary, paragraph 32 of the 
Commentary on Article 10, paragraph 25 on Article 11 and paragraph 21 on Article 12 all refer 
to potential abuses regarding triangular cases. According to these paragraphs, the sought treaty 
benefits should not be granted if the PEs are set up solely for the purpose of treaty benefits. 
Further, in paragraph 71 of the Commentary on Article 24 it is suggested that in order to prevent 
treaty abuse in triangular cases, a specific anti-abuse provision could be added to bilateral tax 
treaties. This provision would state that the treaty benefits in the other state may only be 
obtained if the income is taxed normally in the PE state.149 The Commentary can, however, be 
considered vague and problematic in the way that there is only a possibility of including an 
anti-abuse provision like this, and no clear threshold is provided as to what is “normal 
taxation”. A need for a more precise expression has been brought up by the Netherlands: they 
hope to have a notion that is clear enough so that it could serve as a decisive landmark in 
determining whether a situation is abusive or not.150 
The anti-abuse provision suggested in Action 6 could allow either for the residence state to 
refuse exemption or for the source state to deny treaty benefits if the income is not taxed 
sufficiently. The anti-abuse rule would exclude the application of the treaty between the source 
state and the residence state in triangular cases that result in low taxation of PE income. The 
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source state would thus, in abusive cases, be allowed to levy tax at source on income that it, 
according to the treaty it has with the residence state, would not be allowed to levy.151  
It has been suggested that the threshold of adequate taxation in the PE state would be 60 per 
cent of what it is in the residence state. This means that if the tax imposed in the PE state is less 
than 60 per cent of the tax that would be imposed in the residence state, tax benefits are not 
granted.152 
Even though the clause is assumed to be effective in preventing abusive triangular structures, 
there have been concerns about the broadness of the application of the new clause. One of the 
concerns presented is that there is a possibility that the wording of the new clause also punishes 
those who have not set up the structures for abusive purposes, but for an investment option in 
a low-tax jurisdiction or for business restructuring purposes. Even though lack of activities and 
economic substance may indicate abuse, it is not always the case. For example, the holding of 
shares does not require day-to-day activities, but the business of a company may be investing 
in other entities. This, however, does not mean that there is an abusive structure, but purely 
business.153 Criticism like this is probably why the most recent version of the anti-abuse rule 
includes a provision that allows for the contracting state to grant the benefits when it is justified, 
even if the benefits would otherwise be denied based on another provision.154 
As stated, the proposed clause is expected to effectively eliminate tax avoidance. Firstly, it is 
assumed to prevent abusive tax planning related to triangular situations with PEs in low-tax 
jurisdictions, whilst it still grants the benefits to operational income receive by the PEs. 
Secondly, it also covers low-tax jurisdictions that try to attract artificial business structures by 
offering them reduced tax rates or taxable bases.155 
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9.2 Implementing the Changes 
In implementing changes caused by Action 6, there is another Action to help with 
implementation. As has been stated earlier, tax treaties are generally based on common 
principles that have been designed to prevent double taxation. The base for these treaties often 
comes from model tax conventions, and the contents of the models are reflected in thousands 
of bilateral agreements. As globalisation has raised challenges with respect to base erosion and 
profit shifting, the bilateral tax treaties should be amended in order not to solely focus on 
elimination of double taxation, but also on preventing harmful aggressive tax planning. 
Amending thousands of bilateral treaties would, however, be an enormous project, which is 
why a multilateral instrument has been designed to have the same effects as a simultaneous 
renegotiation of thousands of bilateral treaties. The goal of Action 15 Developing a Multilateral 
Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties is to streamline the implementation of BEPS 
measures that are related to tax treaties.156 The purpose is to have the outcomes implemented 
quickly and consistently across jurisdictions. Consistency is crucial, as inconsistency might 
result in outcomes that are quite the opposite from what is intended in the project.157  
The final text of Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting was released in November 2016 and the signing ceremony 
will take place in June 2017. More than 100 jurisdictions took part in the negotiations and have 
agreed to implement certain minimum standards to counter treaty abuse and improve dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 158 In order to make the Convention flexible enough while remaining 
consistent with its purpose, there is some optionality included. There are parts that reflect a 
minimum standard where opting out is often not possible unless, for example, the standard is 
already met in the contracting party’s treaties. When a provision does not reflect a minimum 
standard, opting out is either partly or entirely possible. For opting out, there is a mechanism 
of reservations, and where the party chooses to use the reservation, the provision in question 
does not apply between this party and other parties.159 
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As regards Action 6 and the anti-abuse rule for permanent establishments situated in third 
jurisdictions, the Multilateral Convention’s Article 10 covers its contents. Article 10 is an 
article that the contracting party can choose to opt out of entirely.160 At present, Finland is 
planning to use reservations regarding all other provisions but the ones where a minimum 
standard is reflected, so Article 10 would not be implemented in Finland’s tax treaties. The 
Ministry of Finance of Finland bases this decision on several factors. First of all, it would be 
challenging to combine the additional provisions with the existing tax treaties that have been 
concluded in the course of several decades. Also, adding more provisions from the Multilateral 
Convention would mean difficulties for the taxpayer to identify and interpret the relevant 
provisions amongst different sources of tax law. Further, as the Multilateral Convention is 
signed already in June 2017, the Ministry of Finance felt that it doesn’t have enough time to 
inspect all the possible changes and their financial effects before the signing. Regardless of the 
decision to opt out of all the optional provisions, Finland can still cancel or reduce its 
reservations later. In addition to this, any of the provisions can be brought up in bilateral tax 
treaty negotiations in the future.161 
When the decision to opt out is evaluated as regards triangular cases in Finland, certain details 
need to be taken into account. For instance, article 10, paragraph 1 of the Multilateral 
Convention provides the conditions under which treaty benefits may be denied. One of the 
conditions is that the profits attributable to the PE are exempted from tax in the residence state. 
However, regarding dividend, interest and royalty income, all of Finland’s tax treaties apply 
the credit method, so if Finland were the residence state, the anti-abuse provision wouldn’t 
apply. If Finland were the PE state, it would likely not have such a low tax rate that the 
provision would apply. Therefore, in many cases, choosing to implement this Article wouldn’t 
cause any changes in how the case would be handled. Whilst it is clear that internationally 
BEPS can eliminate treaty abuse concerning triangular cases, the measures will not affect 
Finland’s tax treaties as Finland decided to opt out, and it is uncertain whether reconsideration 
of the reservation is necessary in the future. 
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10  Conclusions 
The primary objective of this thesis was to find a conclusion on whether triangular cases cause 
problems in Finland and to examine the tax treatment of passive income in triangular cases 
when Finland is in one of the three roles of the triangular case: the source state, the residence 
state or the PE state. 
Based on the findings that have been made in this thesis, unlike expected, triangular cases do 
not seem problematic in Finland. It is, however, possible that on a theoretical level no problems 
seem to occur, but certain schemes or certain combinations of tax treaties give rise to the 
problems. Schemes or combinations like this have, however, not been identified in this thesis, 
nor are such schemes recognized as a problem in the Finnish Tax Administration’s business 
taxation unit of Uusimaa region.162 It could be concluded that either triangular situations don’t 
occur frequently, or they rarely cause problems. This is probably also why there is so little 
information about the matter available in Finnish: as it doesn’t seem problematic, there is little 
reason or interest to examine the matter further. 
It is clear that triangular cases have been taken into account broadly in international tax 
legislation, and problems are likely not to occur when the tax treaties follow the OECD model. 
Still, some explicitness may be necessary regarding issues such as the treaty entitlement of PEs. 
Even though there seems to be an understanding that PEs are not resident persons and are thus 
not entitled to treaty benefits, different interpretations have been provided as discussed in 
chapter 5.3.  
One of the problems that occurs in triangular cases is unrelieved double taxation. It was 
suggested that in a worst case scenario, triangular cases lead to taxation in all of the three states 
involved. Based on the example case in chapter 8, taxation in all states is not a likely outcome 
when Finland is involved because the source state has no taxing rights. Further, when the 
residence state grants relief like in the example, no unrelieved double taxation occurs as the 
only state with unlimited taxing rights is the PE state. The finding that unrelieved double 
taxation does not seem problematic was, in some sense, anticipated, since recently the focus 
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has rather been on treaty abuse than on unrelieved double taxation: the latter is not recognized 
as a matter that requires rapid measures unlike treaty abuse, which is under much greater 
attention at the moment.    
As regards treaty abuse, Finland is probably not a state that attracts or even makes it possible 
to utilize abusive structures. The basic scheme that was described in chapter 6.3.2 only works 
when Finland is the source state, in which case it would often levy no tax on the income. The 
residence state should, however, be one that exempts income in triangular cases, but since 
Finland uses the credit method, it is not a desirable residence state for tax avoidance purposes. 
Further, in the tax avoidance scheme, the PE state would be one that is a low-tax jurisdiction 
or offers special tax privileges to certain types of income. Finland is not regarded as a low-tax 
jurisdiction nor does it provide special tax privileges to the income types discussed in this 
thesis. Therefore, as a PE state, it does not provide possibilities for aggressive tax planning.  
Triangular cases seem to be associated with two separate, opposite problems of unrelieved 
double taxation and double non-taxation. When triangular cases are discussed in literature, 
neither one of the problems is clearly more highlighted than the other. However, now that the 
BEPS Action Plan is timely, the prevention of treaty abuse has been discussed more, and there 
are hopes that the double non-taxation in triangular cases becomes a thing of the past. BEPS 
Action 6 aims at tackling the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances, and it 
should, indeed, prevent the abusive structure that was described in this thesis. It remains to be 
seen whether the action actually makes discussing treaty abuse in triangular cases unnecessary 
in the future. As regards changes in the tax treatment of triangular cases in Finland, BEPS will 
likely not change anything, especially given that Finland will, at least for now, opt out of the 
Multilateral Convention article concerning triangular cases.  
As a conclusion, it can be stated that triangular cases are, with respect to both unrelieved double 
taxation and double non-taxation, problematic for countries other than Finland. As many 
abusive structures, this one, too, requires a tax haven to be a part of the scheme, as well as tax 
treaties that enable abusive structures. When triangular structures are presented in academic 
literature, the jurisdictions that enable treaty abuse are not mentioned, or at least none were 
found in the course of writing this thesis. The structures are thus not as strongly profiled to be 
connected with certain jurisdictions, unlike some schemes that are well known to work in given 
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jurisdictions only: the Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich, the Singapore Sling or the Bermuda 
Black Hole, for instance. As no jurisdictions are mentioned when discussing the problem, it 
leaves the impression that the problem occurs if not everywhere, then at least very often. This 
was the hypothesis that was made in this thesis, too, but the hypothesis was proven incorrect. 
The matter could, however, be investigated regarding the forms of triangular cases that were 
left out in this thesis: dual resident cases and reverse triangular cases. It can, nevertheless, be 
stated that in the course of writing this thesis, no reason to expect bigger difficulties with these 
forms of triangular cases came up. The extensiveness of the problems caused triangular cases 
was not investigated in this thesis and it would probably be difficult to define how big a 
problem treaty abuse in triangular cases in general is. Nonetheless, the problem is evidently 
one big enough that it requires special attention in the BEPS Action Plan. 
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